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ABSTRACT
By Lance L. Arberry
Comparatively, the lawmaking process in presidential systems is often comprised
of negotiations between a legislative body, tasked with authoring and legislating laws,
and an executive, who must authorize and administer the enactment of the law. While
executives are often empowered with certain constitutional powers to help influence the
lawmaking process, these powers are typically constrained and supervisory in nature.
Presidents are rarely given broad-and-discretionary legislative powers, since lawmaking
is ultimately the responsibility of the legislative body; however, this does not hold true
for the case of Brazil.
Following the adoption of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, Presidents were empowered
with the power of Media Provisória, or provisional decree. Conceived as emergency
power to address national crises, provisional decrees provides Brazilian presidents with
the ability to issue orders, rules, and laws that possess the immediate full effect and force
of the law upon issuance, completely independent of the legislative process and the
Brazilian National Congress. While these decrees carry the full effect of the law, they
ultimately require Congressional approval within 45 days of passage. As an emergency
power, provisional decrees ought to be used sparingly; however ideal, this has not been in
the case in Brazil, where presidents have used provisional decrees extensively.
Rather than work with Congress, Brazilian presidents have historically issued
decrees to legislate their policies. In attempt to limit the provisional decrees and regain
legislative control, Brazilian legislators adopted Constitutional Amendment 32, which
drastically curtailed and reformed the usage of decrees. This has led Brazilian legislators,
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political scientists, and constitutional scholars to believe that the use of provisional
decrees has impacted the regular lawmaking process in Brazil, granting Brazilian
executives extraordinary power and influence over the legislature.
This paper sought to understand how the executive-legislative relationship in
Brazil has changed as a result of provisional decrees and Amendment 32. This paper
examined the issuance of provisional decrees, their reissuance, the number of decrees
converted into law, and the number of laws passed under the traditional legislative
process. The research and analysis in this paper indicates that while decrees have become
a dominant tool of Brazilian executives, Amendment 32 has not completely reversed
executive dominance in the executive-legislative relationship of the country.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
On the Presidential System
Throughout the history of the United States, no other institution has represented the
power, the unity, and the influence of the nation more strongly than the President.
Departing from the traditional systems of monarchy and parliament, the Founders of the
United States created a new system of government that diffused power among three
different branches, each containing a unique system to check and balance the power of
each respective branch. Unbeknownst at the time, the Founders institution a unique
forever shape domestic politics, international relations, and constitutional theory in
unexpected ways, through the expansion of the United States’ power and through the
emulation of their creation.
As the head of state, the head of government, and Commander-In-Chief of the United
States Armed Forces, the president has changed broad powers; through the President’s
constitutional role originally concerned matters of foreign affairs (Powell 1472), the
scope and responsibilities of the President has expanded to cover almost every aspect of
domestic policy during the 19th and 20th centuries (Marshall 506). As the President’s
power evolved over time, so too did that of the United States; as the country began to rise
as a global influence and power, many observers attributed the country’s economic,
political, and military success and dominance, in part, to its use of the presidential
system. With this belief in mind, societies from across the world began to model and
organize their governments after the U.S. system. There are 64 countries in the world that
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have adopted the presidential system (Mandelbaum 7), which suggests the popularity of
the U.S. model.
In order to address their own unique needs and to ensure the continuity and success of
their governments, many countries have altered their systems to provide differing powers,
including a wider-array of powers to the president. One of these numerous powers is the
ability of executive degree, the process through which a president is empowered to enact
legislation and policy without the prior consent of the independent legislature. Rather
than submit their policies for consideration by legislatures, executives can effectively
issue decrees to achieve their preferred outcomes. Although it could be argued that this
popular adoption represents the strength and reliance of American democracy, the
expansion of executive decree powers in presidential systems has been called into
question by some keen observers, as countries have adopted this facet of intuitional
design to varying success.
Approval vs. Leadership: Two Types of Legislative Powers Afforded to Presidents
A distinguishing characteristic between presidential and parliamentary systems is the
diffusion of executive and legislative powers. In a parliamentary system, the executive
leadership of the government remains within the power of the legislative body;
conversely in a presidential system, the president maintains executive powers and is
elected independently from the legislature, and often possesses limited legislative powers
(Linz, Mainwaring 4). Within the study of presidentialism, the literature has devoted
considerable attention to the executive-legislative relations of presidential systems; and
more specifically, the trend towards empowering presidents with the ability to influence
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legislation and the legislative processes. These legislative powers have traditionally
defined into two distinctive categories: reactive and proactive (Carey and Shugart 5).
As a preventative measure to halt an action of the legislature, reactive powers allow a
president to prevent the adoption of legislation or policy, despite any institutional
preferences or inclinations to support it; and they are considered to be more
“conservative” powers, due to their ability to halt any alteration of the status quo (Carey
and Shugart 6). The most common and widely known reactive presidential power is the
veto. In the United States, the President is able to use the veto, or threat of use, to block
pieces of legislation that does not reflect the position of their administrations or of their
law-making priorities. Absent an override from both chambers of Congress, the veto
represents a power tool at the disposable of executives. While reactive powers are far
more common amongst presidential systems; many presidential democracies provide
their executives with abilities that enable them to more actively shape the legislative
process.
Proactive powers cover a wide array of tools and mechanisms that empower
presidents to better control the outcomes of the legislature; and these abilities are often
realized through two types of power: agenda-setting and decree authority. The agendasetting power is the ability for an executive to control which areas of policy a legislature
is able to debate and the manner through which the legislature considers a policy (Carey
and Shugart 6; Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power,
Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian
Congres 3). This power is realized through the American president’s ability to convene a
special session of Congress to consider a certain policy, or where the executive possesses
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the exclusive responsibility to introduce policy, as in the cases of budget policy in
Argentina, Chile, and Taiwan (Haggard, McCubbins and Shugart 322). Although agendasetting powers represent a dynamic tool at the disposal of executives, the power of
executive decree represents a far more dynamic and complex mechanism in the formation
of public policy.
Whereas agenda-setting power allows a president to influence and direct a legislature
to consider certain policy, the decree power empowers an executive to directly create and
enact laws without the prior approval of the legislature (Carey and Shugart 9). While the
complete definition and strength of decree powers varies across systems, executive
decrees, to varying extent, are subject to the consent of the legislature. In Russia and the
Ukraine, presidents are able issue decrees covering economic, political, and societal
policy areas; in effect, the only restriction is that the decree cannot be in violation of their
respective constitutions and national laws (Protsyk 645; Carey and Shugart 10). In
Colombia, the president is able to issue effective executive orders during times of
economic crises, where they have emergency powers to restore economic stability (Carey
and Shugart 10). Often, the nature of presidential decrees can be vague, such as case with
Peru. Here, the president is empowered to issue decrees when they are germane to the
country’s national financial and economic interests (Carey and Shugart 10). Historically,
executives have used their decree authority to initiate military actions, to enact budgetary
or organizational reforms, and even to create new governmental departments and
programs. While decrees have a broad range, an important aspect to consider in
observing decree powers is the immediacy and longevity of the policies.
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Carey and Shugart describe decree powers in terms of their immediacy: emergency
powers and traditional constitutional degree authority. In the times of national
emergencies, executives are often vested with broad and extreme discretionary powers,
such as declaring martial law and to curtail civil and political liberties. However,
executives are only authorized to use these emergency powers for the limited duration of
the crisis (Carey and Shugart 15). While these powers are defined in terms of emergency
response, numerous governments and academic researchers have witnessed leaders
exploit, abuse, and routinize emergency powers to their own prerogatives regularly. In
order to curtail and prevent the abuse of these powers, some systems utilize traditional
constitutional degree authority powers that provide the legislative or judiciary bodies
with mechanisms to check the decree powers of an executive.
Although executive decrees are immediately effective upon issuance in the cases of
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Italy, they are ultimately subject to legislative oversight
and approval (Carey and Shugart 11). Known as provisional decrees, the legislative body,
within a certain time frame, must ratify these decrees; or they become null-and-void.
Objectively from a separation of powers perspective, provisional decrees represent a
compromise between the desire to provide an executive with the ability to actively shape
and administer government policy and the desire for a legislature to maintain oversight
over the executive. However ideal, the practical application of executive decrees have
been subject to criticism, as executive decrees have been used to effectively circumvent
the legislative process; thus, representing a shift towards executive dominance in both
presidential and parliamentary systems.
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In Russia, for example, the number of bills passed through the constitutionally
defined legislative process has greatly outnumbered by decrees. Following the failed
coup d'état against President Mikhail Gorbachev and the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
newly elected President Boris Yeltsin urged the drafters of the new Russian constitution
and citizens to empower the president with an overriding decree power to better address
the immediate circumstances and the needs of the Russian people (Parrish 78). Gaining
an almost absolute executive-decree power, the Russian President can issue decrees that
are effectively immediately, and are not subject to legislative oversight, granted that they
do not violate the constitution (Parrish 78). A powerful tool, this decree power
dynamically transformed the legislative process in Russia. During his first term, President
Yeltsin endorsed 5,072 decrees that became law while the legislature passed a meager
425 federal laws during the same period (Parrish 82). These decrees covered a widerange of subjects, such as executive appointments and military promotions to the
privatization of state-owned assets and budget policy, the latter of which is traditionally a
responsibility and prerogative of the legislature (Parrish 90).
Historically in Italy, a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister had been
constitutionally empowered with provisional decree powers; however, leaders found little
recourse to exercise the ability. In their study, Sala and Kreppel examined the total
number of legislation adopted via the legislative process and compared it to that of the
number of decrees issued by the Prime Minister and the decrees ratified by Parliament,
from 1948 to 1992. From the founding of the country in 1948 to 1976, Prime Ministers
worked with Parliament to affect public policy, relying upon the decree very
sporadically; however Sala and Kreppel found this trend to reverse drastically after 1976,
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when the number of decrees issued began to exceed the number of ordinary bills (Della
Sala and Kreppel 189). In the first session of Parliament between 1948-53, the body
approved 2,015 bills and 29 decrees; by the eighth session of 1979-1983, the Parliament
approved 769 bills and 275 decrees. By 1992, this trend was further solidified as
Parliament approved 292 bills while the Prime Minister issued a total of 409 decrees
(Della Sala and Kreppel 190).
The scope and reliance on executive decrees in the Russian presidential system and
the Italian Parliamentary system demonstrate that decrees can dynamically affect the
legislative process of a country, whether it is a presidential or a parliamentary system.
Within the scholarship of executive decrees, one country that presents an interesting case
to study the historical use of decrees by presidents and the attempts by the legislature to
constrain executive dominance in the legislative process is Brazil.
Media Provisória: Provisional Executive Decrees in Brazil
Brazil, one of the world’s largest and most populated countries, has a government that
is unique in that it is a presidential system, modeled highly off of the United States,
which has empowered its president with a powerful and dynamic provisional decree
power (Carey and Shugart 24). A republic since 1886, Brazil adopted a new presidentialbased constitution in 1988 that provided the President and the National Congress with
wide-range of new abilities, including Article 62; which establishes provisional measures
(Vajda, de Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares de Souza 32).
Excluding matters of criminal prosecution, the Brazilian Constitution empowers the
President to issue decrees that immediately possess the force of law; however the
decree’s effectiveness is only temporary, as decrees must receive the endorsement of
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Congress within 60 days (32). While Article 62 specifically mentions that provisional
decrees are to be used in “important and urgent cases”, presidents have often relied upon
this emergency power as an indispensable tool to shape the legislative process. Pereira,
Power, and Rennó found that over the first 13 years under the new constitutions,
Presidents issued a decree every single week, and that this represented more than 75% of
all the laws passed during those years (71, 75). While these decrees ultimately require
Congressional approval, Brazilian Presidents were able to indefinitely reissue these
decrees, regardless of any attempts of Congressional oversight (76) (Parrish 40). Brazil’s
constitution empowered the executive and legislative branches to both influence and
control the legislative process; however through the use of provisional decrees, it has
allowed the executive branch to exert tremendous influence over the legislative agenda
(Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential
Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congres; Carey
and Shugart; Della Sala and Kreppel).
Realizing that Article 62 weakened Congress’s oversight and lawmaking
prerogatives, the Brazilian legislators adopted Constitutional Amendment 32 in an
attempt to exert its power over the executive branch by constraining the President’s
ability to issue decrees. (Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda
Power, Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the
Brazilian Congres 71). Following the adoption of Amendment 32, Presidents were no
longer able to issue decrees indefinitely; rather, decrees can only be reissued once, and
only if Congress did not consider the decree within the 60-day timeframe (Vajda, de
Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares de Souza 156). Additionally, Amendment 32
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provides the Congress with a more direct mechanism for decree oversight. If either
chamber of Brazil does not consider the measure’s Congress within 45 days, then that
decree is advanced to the top of legislative agenda and supersedes all other matters
(Vajda, de Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares de Souza 156). Despite their
intentions to regain power, Pereira, Power, and Rennó found that the application of
Amendment 32 actually further strengthened the executive’s power. Since Congress must
consider each-and-every decree once it has passed the 45-day mark, the legislative
agenda became increasing slowed and gridlocked. Known as “trancamento da pauta”, or
the lockdown of the agenda, it represents another hurdle of the legislative branch
(Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential
Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congres 71).
Purpose of Study and Summary:
Featuring an exceedingly fragmented multi-party system, a unique federal system
representing a diverse population, and a vibrant presidential system, Brazil offers a
unique opportunity to study executive-legislative relations by examining the factors that
influence the relationship (Mainwaring, Multipartism, Robust Federalism and
Presidentialism in Brazil 89); however, the literature has not discussed the impact of
media provisória or constitutional Amendment 32 as extensively.
This study seeks to understand how the dynamics in the relationship between Brazil’s
executive and legislative leadership evolved through the implementation of the 1988
Constitution, the use of provisional decrees, and the attempt to reform the power through
Amendment 32 of the Brazilian Constitution. Beginning with a historical overview of
Brazil and its presidential system, I study the country’s executive-legislative relationship
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by analyzing the use of provisional decrees during the administrations of Presidents
Cardoso and Lula and the amount of legislative oversight the Brazilian National Congress
had over these decrees. In order to measure the use of provisional decrees and
Congressional oversight, this study utilized descriptive process tracing to account for
each institution’s activities. Using data gathered from the Brazilian National Archives
from 1996 to 2007, I track the issuance of provisional decrees issued, reissued, converted
into law, and those rejected by the Congress and compare that data to the number of
ordinary legislation passed through the traditional legislative process in the legislature.
To analyze the dynamics in the system’s executive-legislative relationship, I describe
executive legislative success as the number provisional decrees issued, reissued, and
converted into law; conversely, I measure legislative oversight by examining the number
of provisional decrees, impaired, nullified, and otherwise rejected by the Congress.
Using these data, I concluded overall that while Amendment 32 reformed and
constrained Presidents Cardoso and Lula’s ability to exercise their provisional decree
ability, the Amendment did not allow for the Brazilian National Congress to completely
regain its oversight and lawmaking responsibilities. Additionally, I compare my findings
to the established literature on provisional decrees in Brazil; and found that my data
supports both prevailing theories that describe the motivations behind executives issuing
provisional decrees and the legislature’s overwhelming approval of these measures. I
conclude by discussing some relevant implications of provisional decree usage on public
policy, articulating some weakness and limitations of my study, and finally by suggesting
some future areas for study.
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In order to comprehend and understand the environment in which provisional decree
usage arose in Brazil, I will first review the relevant literature on the systematic
foundations and key differences between the presidential and parliamentary systems.
Next, I will briefly provide a general overview of the Brazilian federal government, and
then discuss the numerous factors that contribute to the legislative environment in Brazil.
Lastly, I discuss the two predominate interpretations of how and why provisional decrees
are used.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
In order to better understand provisional decree usage in Brazil, I will first review
three areas of literature that provides insight to form a working foundation of knowledge
for this study. First, I review the literature on the presidential and parliamentary systems.
While the former system is more popular, some scholars believe that the latter is much
better suited for the majority of presidential countries. I articulate the major differences
between the two, and then describe how presidential systems have the capability and
increased risk to become burdened with legislative gridlock. This discussion is relevant
as Brazil adopted provisional decrees in an effort to avoid and counter legislative
gridlock due to the unique intricacies of their presidential system.
Next, I provide an overview of the Brazilian system. I begin with an overview of
the constitutional underpinnings of the system. An open-list multiparty proportional
representation system, Brazil is often characterized as having a weak centralized party
system. I discuss the Brazilian party system in more detail, and then review the literature
on the legislative process in Brazil. This system’s legislature is unique in that it is highly
transient, its legislators and parties lack discipline, and that there is very little institutional
knowledge and experience maintained through each successive congress. Furthermore, I
assess a peculiarity in the legislative electoral process; by which politicians decisively
attempt to seek out local officials and gubernatorial candidates, instead of presidential
candidates, for support. Taken together, these factors contribute to the unique system
through which provisional decree usage has flourished. As a result of this system’s
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foundations, the academic community has sought to understand why presidents rely upon
provisional decrees and how their usage impacts the legislative process and relationship
in Brazil.
Among the study of provisional decrees in Brazil, the established work has been
articulated into two disparate conclusions. I analyze these conclusions to provide a
foundation of what has been established, and I will later use my data and compare my
findings to these established theories.
The Question of Régime Type: Presidential v. Parliamentary Models
Within the study of political science, the academic community has devoted
considerable effort to discuss, debate, and analyze the intrinsic differences between the
two methods of government organization. The scholarship seeks to examine the
distinguishing characteristics of the two systems, their relative advantages and
disadvantages, and how both systems are able to withstand and adapt to the various
events and issues that impact governance. Inherent to any functioning régime is the
principle of survival and stability. A country’s decision to adopt a certain method can
influence the survival and stability of the government; historically, “between the years of
1946-1999, one in every twenty-tree presidential régimes died, whereas only one in every
fifty-eight parliamentary regimes died” (Cheibub and Limongi 1). While there are
numerous factors those impact régime survival and performance, the two models are able
to adapt to these factors in different ways and with varying success; and thus, the choice
between the two models becomes increasingly important.
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Powerful, Popular, and Perplex: Defining the Presidential System
A defining characteristic of the presidential system is the division of executive
and legislative powers; within this system, the legislative branch exists separately and
independently from the executive branch of the president. While the President of the
United States, and its relationship between the legislative and judicial powers, serves as
the exemplar of this model, presidential scholars have noted three primary characteristics
of this system: first, the president is constitutionally bound with a limited mandate to lead
(Linz; Lijphart); second, the president is elected upon a popular, “winner-takes-all”, basis
that is independently from the legislature (Linz; Mainwaring); and third, the president is
exclusively responsible for administrating the laws and regulations of the government
and is responsible for the regular operation of the national government (Shugart and
Carey; Mainwaring).
While the literature generally recognizes these three distinctions, Shugart and
Carey distinguish a fourth feature of the presidential system that is important to mention:
fourthly, a president is empowered with some form of power, some measure that enables
the executive to influence the formation of legislative language, policy, and law (21). As
the head of government, the president is often tasked with the enforcement of the law;
typically, presidents are not granted sweeping legislative powers. Despite this, Shugart
and Carey note that often, a president is granted the power of the veto to shape legislative
policy.
Constitutionally, a president and his or her administration are elected to govern on
a limited and temporal mandate; additionally, a president is subject to re-election upon
the competition of the term, and is often further confined by term limits. In contrast to
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parliamentary systems, where a ruling government is dependent upon the constant
support of the electorate, a president, while elected popularly, is not reliant upon popular
support; and this characteristic provides certain advantages and disadvantages. Whereas a
parliament would have to seriously consider the immediate implications of policy
decisions and outcomes, a president would be able to introduce more difficult and
comprehensive policies without being subjected to the often shifting beliefs and the
opinions of the electorate. In terms of régime stability, this characteristic has often been
described as a unique advantage of the presidential model; however, these mandates have
also been the source of corruption, manipulation, and failure of numerous presidential
governments.
Throughout recent political history, the American form of government and the
successes of the American presidency have served as models of emulation for many
democracies; however, the subsequent adoptions have not always yielded the same
results in promise. Indeed, within states that adopted a presidential system, the literature
has noted several characteristics and negative consequences of adopting and managing a
presidential system poorly. Among the many aspects of the presidential model, the
literature has focused on the undesirable outcomes of: governmental gridlock, resulting
from irreconcilable differences in opinion and policy decisions between the executive and
legislative powers (Mainwaring; Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism; Cheibub and
Limongi); because of the winner-take-all electoral system and potential for gridlock,
presidential systems often have a higher-risk of deteriorating into authoritarian régimes
(Cheibub and Limongi; Linz); the scholarship has also described how a presidential
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system possess the capability to intensify to ethnic tensions within a state, ultimately
resulting in ethnic conflicts (Linz).
As witnessed through the recent difficulties between the Obama administration
and the divided Congress, presidential systems are susceptible conflicting political
opinions and are also susceptible to governmental gridlock. While the American system
has been able to sufficiently overcome this obstacle, other governments have not been as
successful. If governments are unable to overcome gridlock and irreconcilable
difficulties, these systems are more prone to state failures; Cheibub and Limongi found
that during presidential systems of the third-wave of democratization, one out of every 26
presidential system perished as a result of gridlock while only one out of every 31
parliamentary systems failed as a result of gridlock. The literature has attempted to
articulate the reasoning for the disparate results during the same time period; and one
prominent answer points towards the ability of parliaments to order new elections, and
this mechanism allows these systems to better adapt to gridlock (Tsebelis).
The Parliamentary System
Where the sharp division between executive and legislative powers marks
presidential systems, parliamentary systems possess no such difference; rather, the
authority and responsibility for the administration of the government lies solely within its
legislative body (Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism; Lijphart). The most prominent
example of this system is the power held by the two houses of the British Parliament.
Known as the Westminster model, the British Parliament is a bicameral legislature
composed of the Houses of Lords and Commons; and this form of government has been
adopted by numerous democracies. Within this system, constituents elect representatives
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to national legislatures; who in turn, select executive leadership from the legislature’s
membership. Where presidents govern on a specific and often time-limited mandate,
parliamentary leadership is subject to the shifting and moving confidences of elected
representatives and the electorate itself.
Founded upon the idea of legislative confidence, these systems are defined by a
fundamental requirement of a “majoritarian imperative”, where a ruling regime existence
is tied to the support of the legislative body; and if a majority is not achieved, new
elections must be scheduled to support a functioning government (Cheibub and Limongi
4). For parliamentary systems, the center of government is created or dissipated by
support. Within the deliberative bodies, legislators elect a representative, often called the
prime minister, whom establishes a cabinet to represent and administer the government.
Throughout the adoption of this form, much of the academic literature has found that
these systems, subjected to the will of the people’s representatives, offer substantial
advantages, such as: state stability, as parliamentary systems can utilize inherent
mechanisms to replace a weak or inefficient administration; government efficiency, as
governments are often formed based upon a legislative coalition that seeks to advance a
specific régime; and the potential for more accurate representation, as parties and
individual representatives are able to reflect the diverse constituencies of the populations
(Cheibub and Limongi; Shugart and Carey).
Realizing that state stability and gridlock are essential to a functioning
government, decrees can serve as a bridge between the two systems. In an effort to
maximize the government’s ability to act given harsh division in a legislature, decrees
allow presidents to temporarily circumvent the legislative process. A strong presidential
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system, Brazil represents one such bridge, as their presidents are able to issue provisional
decrees. With provisional decrees, presidents are able to control the legislative agenda
and rationalize decisions, very similar to how a prime minister would. Before an analysis
of how provisional decrees can proceed, an understanding of the cultural and political
history of Brazil is necessary.
República Federativa do Brasil:
Historical Overview of the Federal Republic of Brazil
Gaining its independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil is a culturally diverse
country that has a rich political, social, and economic history. Politically, Brazil is a
federal presidential republic, encompassing 27 subnational states, which features a strong
multi-party system and proportional representation. Central power is diffused into three
different branches: the executive, led by the President and its cabinet; the legislature,
embodied by the National Congress of Brazil; and the judicial, represented by the
Supreme Federal Court and Superior Court of Justice.
A strong presidential system, Brazilian presidents are empowered with a widerange of constitutional abilities at their disposal. Excluding provisional decrees, the
President possess a strong veto power, including standard, pocket, and a partial line-item
veto. These vetoes, however, are often subject to override, as both chambers of the
Brazilian Congress only require a simple majority to nullify the President’s veto.
Additionally, the President is empowered with the exclusive right to initiate and
introduce legislation, covering a range of policy areas including: defense and matters of
national security, creation of federal departments and control over salaries, direction and
funding of the criminal-justice system (Vajda, de Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares
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de Souza 40). In his study of presidential systems, Mainwaring found that there are only
six presidential systems that provide executives with this power; and in Brazil, this
represented a sweeping power that grants the President an inordinate amount of power
over Congress (61). Objectively, the President and Congress each have unique
constitutional powers that enable them to jointly work together to bring about policy;
historically, however, the President has had more success at influencing the legislative
process due to the tendency for the National Congress to be institutionally gridlocked.
A bicameral legislature, the National Congress of Brazil is composed of the
Federal Senate, the upper chamber, and the Chamber of Deputies, the body’s lower
house. Similar to the United States, each of the 27 sub-national states is provided equal
representation with three Senators, elected on a plurality system. Another unique facet of
Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies differs by utilizing a proportional-representation system
to allocate seats to each sub-national state, based on population. While the multiparty
system in Brazil allows for the inclusion of different political parties and more diverse
representation, it also allows for certain unusual political occurrences and unfavorable
outcomes.
Multiparty System in Brazil
Characterized by “notorious party underdevelopment, the most distinctive feature
of Brazilian political parties are their fragility, their ephemeral character, their weak roots
in society, and the autonomy politicians of the catch-all parties enjoy with respect to their
parties” (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 354), a major source of
influence over executive-legislative relationship in Brazil is its unique party system.
Where most presidential systems contain smaller parties, Brazil’s multiparty system is
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often a cause of gridlock and debate; because of this factor, Brazil is cited as a state
where the state is far more dominant influence than individual parties (Mainwaring,
Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 387; Samuels and Zucco, The Power of
Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments 4) Throughout the country’s
history, Mainwaring notes that there have been seven distinct party systems; essentially,
the country has observed one-party, two-parties, and multiparty system since its
foundation (361). While it is important to underscore the systems and transitions the
country has undergone, the current multiparty system, founded shortly after the adoption
of the 1988 Constitution, is the only system germane to this study.
Under the current system, Mainwaring defines three archetypes of political
parties, each with their own advantages and disadvantages: “disciplined and
programmatic parties, moderately disciplined parties, and loosely organized parties that
have comparatively weak programmatic commitments” (376). Among these three
archetypes, there are over 27 registered political parties; however, the most prominent
parties are Partido dos Trabalhadores (the Worker’s Party, or PT); Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira (the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, or PSDB); and, Partido
do Movimento Democrático Brasilerio (the party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement,
or PMDB) (Samuels and Zucco, The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from
Survey Experiments 2). While the PT and PSDB have been the only successful parties in
obtaining the presidency, Brazil’s party system is far more complex due its numerous
parties and electoral volatility (Samuels, The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism
and Congressional Elections in Brazil 5). Weak and numerous, the strongest hurdle for
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political parties is ensuring party cohesion, unity, loyalty, and strength; however, this is
difficult due to how Brazilian politicians see and associate with political parties.
Unstable and fluid, the composition of Brazilian political parties is constantly
subjected to the changing beliefs and membership of politicians. In Brazil where political
parties are often weak and disorganized, campaigns for political offices are highly
individualistic; here, politicians often rely on their own individual talents, staff, and
fundraising abilities to win elections. For Brazilian politicians, they do not see political
parties as practical entities that provide them with resources or opportunities; rather
politicians view parties as “a partido de alugue,” or rentals (Samuels and Zucco, The
Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments 159). In terms of
party membership and composition, this forces many politicians to conduct an impact
calculus on their identification; from a rational self-interest perspective, Brazilian
politicians use parties as a vehicle to advance their agendas (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak
Parties, Feckless Democracy 376; Samuels and Zucco, The Power of Partisanship in
Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments 157). Parties are known as “rentals” because
when the party no longer suits or advances a politician’s interest, he or she will switch to
one that provides better opportunities. From the perspective of legislative stability and
efficiency, this can cause chaos on the legislative process, and has happened numerous
times throughout the history of the country. In 1987, 72 Congressmen loyal to the Béte
Noire (Arena or the PDS) party became members of the PMBD overnight (Mainwaring,
Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 378). In 1978, a body of 78 MBD elected
mayors jointly changed party identification to PDS (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties,
Feckless Democracy 378). Additionally from 1991-1998, Desposato found that 474
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Congressmen and over 17 Senators switched parties during the time period (7). In these
instances, the large number of politicians changed parties because it served their selfrational interests; and while this attributes to some political conversions, another
prominent reason is because of the Brazil’s catchall parties.
Historically, ideology has influenced party unity and cohesion of Brazilian
political parties; more specifically, Mainwaring and Perez Lifian found that ideologically
left parties have historically been able to better control and discipline their members. By
analyzing roll-call votes of Brazilian Congressmen and comparing those against party
directives, they found that members of the PT were strongly cohesive and unified; PT
legislators voted against the party 2% of the time and scored a 98.0 on their party
discipline scale (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, Party Discipline in the Brazilian National
Congress 14). Here, the PT’s party cohesion, discipline, and loyalty is not representative
of the all political parties; and Mainwaring and Perez Lifian found that party switching,
while influenced by ideology, is ultimately influenced by the party to provide power and
benefits to the individual legislator (18). Additionally, catchall political parties have also
contributed to the phenomena. As a result of Brazil’s multiparty, proportional
representation system, some political parties seek to rationalize power through numbers
rather than belief; catchall parties mobilize along multiple ideologies to acquire support
(Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 380). Gathering behind
numbers rather than belief, it is not surprising that catchall parties are highly
undisciplined; most notably, the PMBD, a catchall party, has historically scored lowed in
terms of discipline, 65 out of 100, and has seen numerous party defections (Mainwaring
and Linan, Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress 467). As a whole,
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the nature of the various parties have led to legislative issues, such as members of
political parties defecting to other parties, the inability to ensure that each representative
votes along party lines, and the style of representation that prevent the President’s party
from electing a congressional majority. Given the highly individualistic nature of political
campaigns, observers have noted that rather railing behind a national political party and
presidential campaigns, many politicians have turned to governors for electoral support.
Known as the “gubernatorial coattails effect,” Samuels found that due rather than
national parties and national figures, candidates for state governorships possess far more
influence and clout in congressional elections (Samuels, The Gubernatorial Coattails
Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil 241). He cites the relative
weakness of national political parties at the state and local levels as reasons why
congressional candidates often shape their political campaigns around the platform of a
gubernatorial candidate (Samuels 241-242). Samuels cites four distinct factors as to why
candidates are more likely to align themselves with gubernatorial candidates: (1) the
fragmented and pathetic state of national parties, (2) the relative strength of the diverse
state governments, (3) the prevalence of electoral rules, and (4) the sheer fact that state
elections are often held at the same time of congressional elections (Samuels 241-245).
Shugart’s research on Brazilian political parties lends support the Samuel’s position;
except for a select few parties, national political parties in Brazil are relatively weak at
the subnational level (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 380). Due
to the fact that the relative strength and organization of national political parties are weak
the state level, Samuels states that on average there are up to four candidates, from
different parties, in each gubernatorial race and these candidates attempt to assimilate
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other candidates, from the various municipal, state, and local campaigns, into their
stronger gubernatorial campaign in order consolidate power, consolidate resources and to
gain political momentum (243). The combined effort of the multiple campaigns provides
better odds of winning the election on the coattails of the gubernatorial candidate. The
second and fourth factor, that is the strength of states and the timing of the elections,
support Samuels’ theory. Due to their proximity to local issues and the electorate,
candidates for Congress are more likely to align with a potential governor for access to
resources and perks, than the distant federal executive (Samuels 243).
Together, this discussion of the theoretical foundations of presidential power, the
overview of Brazil’s federal government, and the unique multiparty system contributes to
the utilization of provisional decrees by Brazilian presidents. Afflicted by weak political
party cohesion and discipline, burdened by ever-changing party composition, and
weakened by the gubernatorial coattails effect, there are numerous factors that shape the
relationship Brazilian presidents have with the Congress. While there has been
considerable research analyzing the impact of political parties and their impact, there has
been little research to describe the impression provisional decrees have had on Brazil’s
separation of powers.
Literature on Provisional Decrees and its Impact on Brazil’s Separation of Powers
Of what work has been done, there is a debate concerning the extent of the
legislature’s lawmaking power is diminished as a result of provisional decrees. Abstractly
an argument concerning the strength and tenacity of Brazil’s separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches of government, most of the literature on
provisional decrees in Brazil has defined decrees as representing an erosion of legislative
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power at the bequest and advantage of the president. With each decree issued and passed,
these observers view it as the executive gaining more power. Where most have seen
provisional decrees as an erosion of legislative power, others have found that provisional
decrees serve the interest of individual legislators and the legislature, as a whole. This
belief is founded upon the idiosyncratic characteristics of Brazil’s system, and that this is
the only manner through which meaningful and substantial policy can come into
existence.
Supporting the argument that decrees represent an erosion of legislative power
and the strengthening of the executive, Pereira, Power, and Renno’s most strongly
support the notion that the executive-legislative relationship has shifted. Analyzing the
monthly issuance of provisional decrees from 1995-2005, Perira et al. concluded that
provisional decrees and the intentional results of Amendment 32 have provided the power
with extraordinary power to control the legislative agenda (Pereira, Power and Rennó,
From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended
Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress 74). Their research was composed of
multivariate regression and descriptive statistics analyzing the provisional decrees, the
levels of presidential popularity and legislative support, and other variables. While they
found that provisional decrees were used extensively throughout the timeframe, they
conclusions focused Amendment 32 and the extent to which the legislature limited the
use of decrees and regained legislative control. Following the adoption of Amendment
32, Congress is required to consider each provisional decree within the first 45-days after
issuance; if Congress does not, then it is immediately placed at the top of the legislative
docket for urgent consideration. As a result, Perira et al. found that Presidents have used
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this ability to stall the legislative process. In 2005, their research concluded that the
executive decrees accounted for 65% of all the Federal Senate’s legislative sessions
(Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential
Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress 71).
Additionally, after Amendment 32, the conversion rate of executive decrees was in fact
higher than post, equaling 79%. They cite these two factors as evidence that the president
has excreted considerable influence over the legislature.
While the work of Perira et al. lends support to the executive dominance
interpretation of provisional decrees, their research does not take into account some
crucial factors. They concluded that Amendment 32 further weakened Congress’s power
through the automatic consideration provision; however, they did not consider the impact
of Congressional approval and disapproval of decrees, and they did not consider the
ability for legislatures and political party to support their individual legislation in their
analysis. While it important to underscore the use of provisional decrees, there are many
more factors that define Brazil’s lawmaking process. In contrast to the work of Perira et
al., the work of Reich supports an alternative interpretation of Amendment 32 and
provisional decrees.
Rather than representing erosion of power, Reich found that provisional decrees
in Brazil are more strongly identified as a rational delegation decision to outsource
certain lawmaking to the executive (14). To support this conclusion, Reich considered
how the countries diverse and unique party system impacts lawmaking. From an
American perspective, it is quite perplexing why a legislature would provide a president
with such considerable power; however, Reich makes an important distinction in this
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assumption. Political turnover in the legislature is much higher in Brazil’s Congress than
in the United States; Reich compared the 10% turnover in the U.S. House of
Representatives to that of Brazilian Chamber of Deputies average of 50% (Reich 14).
Additionally, Reich supported his argument that Congress is voluntarily willing to
succeed power to the President because the executive branch possesses far more
institutional knowledge and experience at creating and administering laws. He supported
this contention by examining the committee structure within Congress, which has
historically been weak and disorganized.
In the United States, legislators seek to gain policy experience by specializing on
a few key interests and use the committee structure to further enhance their experience;
however in Brazil, this is not the case. In Brazil, legislators are unable to gain significant
policy experience because of the legislature’s framework. Institutional rules of both the
Chambers of Deputies and Federal Senate mandate that the executive leadership of
committees change every two years, and that legislators cannot be reelected to serve
consecutive terms within the same committee; as a result, this has led to a lack of policy
experience and development (Reich 15). Thus, Reich interpreted the use of provisional
decree data to represent an expressed will of the Brazilian Congress to enable the bettered
prepared and experienced executive with responsibility of drafting some laws.
Additionally, Reich also disputed Perira et al.’s contention that instead of limiting
provisional decrees, Amendment 32 increased the number of decrees that were converted
into law. While the conversion rate was higher in the post-Amendment 32 period, Reich
argued that legislative oversight was not diminished because of legislative amendments.
Reich found that 65.4% of all converted decrees during this period contained
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amendments that either reformed the use of the decree and added pork and other
earmarks for social policy (17). Reich ultimately concludes that amendments to
provisional decrees, prior to conversion, represents legislative oversight and weakening
Perira et al.’s argument (22).
Relevancy of Literature
The review of literature concerning the presidential and parliamentary systems,
the constitutional organization of Brazil’s federal government, its party system and
structure, and the competing theories on provisional decree usage draws an interesting
illustration about the nature of Brazil’s legislative process. Initially modeled highly after
the United States’ system of government, Brazil represents an interesting case to study
the effects one presidential power has on the lawmaking process and on the country’s
separation of power.
With numerous political parties vying for leadership, the weak and undisciplined
nature of some political parties, the lack of any institutional knowledge and experience
due to the committee structure, the literature review tends to support Reich’s conclusion
concerning provisional decree usage. Realizing that institutionally Congress does not
have the experience or means to enact substantial policy or legislation, Congress
voluntarily and willfully allows the president to create policy through provisional decree;
and once it has been enacted, Congress is able to exercise its oversight prerogatives by
either rejecting the decree from consideration or by adopting the text of the provisional
decree with various amendments individual legislators might offer.
If Reich’s conclusions are true, it would be expected that after the adoption of
Amendment 32, which reformed the use of provisional decrees, that a much larger
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portion of provisional decrees would be either rejected or amended before converted into
law; this would be expected because the executive would no longer be able to indefinitely
issue their provisional decrees. Additionally if Reich’s interpretation is accurate, there
would be no substantial increase in the amount of original decrees issued either before or
after Amendment 32. Amendment 32, while restricting the reissuing of decrees, did not
impact Congress’s ability to provide oversight to provisional decrees; as a result,
Amendment 32 would have no impact on the continued use of decrees by Presidents or
the number of decrees issued per year. While the literature tends to support Reich’s
contention that the usage of provisional decrees and the subsequent conversion of those
decree in law is a rational choice and decision of Congress, the literature also supports the
competing interpretation that decrees represent an erosion of separation of powers and
Congress’s legislative prerogatives.
Pereira, Power, and Renno’s research supports the notion that provisional decree
usage has allowed the executive to effectively dominate the legislative process in Brazil.
Pereira et al. hold that, due to the various dynamics in the relationship between the two
organizations and the factors that influence the legislative process, the use of the
provisional decrees have become a regular ability that presidents exercise to enact their
legislative agendas. If their findings are valid, it would be expected that the number of
provisional decrees issued would continue to increase per year, and that Amendment 32
would not have an impact on usage of decrees. Furthermore, Pereira et al. believe that
Amendment 32 further weakened Congress’ ability to provide oversight of provisional
decrees by mandating that both chamber address each and every provisional decree. If
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this contention holds true, I would expect that the number of provisional decrees rejected
or nullified by Congress to be lower than prior to the adoption of the amendment.
While the two competing interpretations of provisional decree usage provide
compelling arguments and inferences for Brazil’s legislative process, Reich and Pereira et
al.’s work does not resolve all of the questions regarding decrees. Pereira et al.’s
contention that Amendment 32 weakens Congressional oversight does not address, and is
in fact at odds with, Reich’s findings. Additionally, Reich’s work does not address
Pereira et al. opinion that provisional decrees have represented a large component of all
new laws created in Brazil.
My research seeks to provide an understanding of the two prevailing theories on
provisional decrees and their conclusions. In the following chapter, I describe how I use
descriptive process tracing to test two hypotheses linked to Pereira et al. and Reich’s
findings. First, I hypothesize that if Pereira et al.’s beliefs are true, Brazilian presidents
have routinize provisional decree usage. I expect that if it has in fact become routinized,
then the number of provisional decrees issued should increase in each subsequent year. If
it has not, then I expect the number of decrees issued will fluctuate from each year and
with each president. My second hypothesis focuses on Congressional approval of
provisional decrees and Reich’s work. I hypothesize that after the adoption of
Amendment 32, Congress was able to provide more oversight over provisional decrees
and was able to regain some control over the legislative process. To measure
Congressional oversight, I examine the number of provisional decrees that were rejected,
impaired, and found ineffective by Congress. Additionally, I examined Congress’s role in
the legislative process by measuring how many ordinary pieces of legislation Congress
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passed both before and after Amendment 32. If Pereira et al.’s conclusions are true, I
expect the total provisional decrees converted to be higher after Amendment 32 and that
the total number of ordinary legislation to be lower during the same time period.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD
RESEARCH QUESTION
As demonstrated in the previous two chapters, the use of provisional decrees by
Brazilian Presidents has been widely discussed and studied, both from Brazilian
legislators and by international and comparative political scientists. Commonly
representing a trend towards the executive dominance of the legislative process, this
study focused on articulating how the use of provisional decree has impacted the
legislative process in Brazil. In a presidential system, there is a competing struggle for
power between that of a president, who must represent the interests of country as a
whole, and that of the legislative body, whose members represents the divergent and
diverse interests of the various constituencies. Although there are traditional influences of
elections, political parties, and political interests common to all systems, there are
numerous factors that can shape and alter the relationship between the executive and the
legislative powers in Brazil; and this study sought to address how both the president and
the Congress have reacted to these influences.
This study focused on assessing the legislative success of Brazil’s presidents by
examining the issuance of provisional decrees and how these were converted into law,
and Congress’s ability to provide effective oversight over these provisional decrees by
examining how many decrees were either supported or rejected by Congress. To
accomplish this, the study compared two central components: first, how many provisional
decrees were issued, how many were subsequently reissued, and how many provisional
decrees were successfully converted into law. Secondly, this study examined Congress’s
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legislative oversight capabilities by measuring how many provisional decrees were either
approved or otherwise rejected by the legislature. Additionally, this research sought to
understand Brazil’s legislative process by examining the total number of ordinary
legislation passed through Congress and comparing this data to provisional decrees.
Provisional decree powers were formally introduced in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution;
however, this study sought to measure the impact Amendment 32 had on the issuance of
decrees and on the executive-legislative and lawmaking relationship. Adopted in 2001,
this study tracked the provisional decrees and traditional laws passed over a ten-year
period, beginning with the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1997 to 2003
and ending with presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2003-2010. Using these
data, the research concentrated on two hypotheses.
HYPOTHESES
H1: Conceptualized as an emergency power, Brazilian presidents have routinized the use
of provisional decrees by regularly issuing provisional decrees.

H2: Introduced to further clarify and refine the use of provisional decrees, the adoption of
Constitutional Amendment 32 empowered Congress to exercise its oversight
prerogatives, as measured by the number of provisional decrees rejected by the
legislature.
DESCRIPTIVE PROCESS TRACING
Qualitative in nature, descriptive process tracing was selected for the method of
this study. Within the study of political science research, the use, expansion, and
definition of process tracing has progressed over the past decade. Described as a
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“fundamental tool of qualitative research”, it enables a research to answer questions
through “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of
research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 823). Process
tracing allows for researchers to form inferences and conclusions from data that is often
too difficult or ambiguous (Collier 1). While process tracing is a typical method of
political science research, there has been a lack of a centralized standard for the method;
and this has led to various misperceptions about the central tenants of process tracing
(Barnes and Weller 3); however for the purpose of this study, descriptive process tracing
was used.
Descriptive process tracing enables a research to “make decisive contributions to
diverse research objectives, including identifying novel political and social phenomena
and systematically describing them, evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering
new hypotheses, and assessing these new casual claims, and gaining insight into casual
mechanisms” (Collier 824). Central to this study was examining how the dynamics of the
executive-legislative relationship has changed, and thus process tracing provides a
capable method of explaining the gradual dynamics in the relationship. Additionally,
descriptive process tracing enables a research to overcome a major hurdle of quantitative
research: casual analysis.
When using process tracing, investigators are often presented with numerous
variables and “infinite number of intervening casual steps between any independent and
dependent variables” (Mahoney 125). Indeed, as this study has focused on examining the
legislative success of two parties, there are numerous variables that can overwhelm the
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researcher; however descriptive-process tracing is able to overcome this fault through
focusing on one core aspect: time.
“As a tool of causal inference, process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events
or situations over time” (Collier 824), process tracing represents an ideal method for
analyzing data concerning the number of bills passed each year. It is able to accomplish
this analysis through the discovery of casual-process observations, or CPOs, are “insights
or pieces of data that provide information about context, process, or mechanism, and that
contribute distinct leverage in casual inferences” (Brady, Collier and Seawright 277).
While process tracing examines history, how events have evolved over time, it can
provide more detailed analysis and inferences, “A process-tracing explanation differs
from a historical narrative, as it requires converting a purely historical account that
implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical
variables that have been identified in the research design” (Bennett and George 3).

MEASURES
This study analyzed data derived from the official website of the Brazilian Federal
Government, Planlto.gov.br. A government archive, the website contains an expansive
record database of official government documents, from the Constitution, to common and
supplemental laws, and all executive decrees issued since the establishment of the 1988
Constitution. Using Google Translate and translation from a Portuguese speaker, this
study examined two aspects of law: provisional decrees and common laws. These two
aspects were of the law were measured using the following descriptions.
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Provisional Decrees Issued
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees issued per year by presidents.
Provisional Decrees Converted
This measure tracks the number of provisional decrees that were successfully adopted by
the Brazilian National Congress, and subsequently was converted into I’m permanent
laws.
Provisional Decrees Reissued
This measure tracks the number of provisional decrees that were subsequently reissued
by a president after failing to be converted into law. Prior to Amendment 32, presidents
were allowed to indefinitely reissue decrees. Following Amendment 32, presidents are
only allowed to reissue the decree once, within the same session of the legislature.
Provisional Decrees Rejected
This measure tracks the number of provisional decrees that were not converted into law
by Congress, and were subsequently declared null and void.
Provisional Decrees Impaired
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees which legal status were
compromised through legislative action. For instance, a provisional decree can be
impaired when a legislative act alters the specific body of law the decree addressed.
Provisional Decrees Ineffective
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees that were not converted,
reissued, revoked, or rejected, and thus expired after its respective effectiveness date.
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Common Laws Passed
This measure refers to the number of laws that were passed through the traditional
legislative process and that were subsequently signed into law by Brazilian presidents.
Common Laws Vetoed
This measure refers to the number of laws, passed through the traditional legislative
process, that were vetoed by Brazilian presidents.

ANALYSIS PLAN
The following chapter contains the results of the research conducted for this
study. Examining legislative data over the period of ten years, the results have been
summarized by examining the total number of provisional decrees issued, reissued, and
converted. The results are separated by time: the first measuring the total scope of the
study, from 1997-2007; the second measuring the total from the beginning of the study to
the adoption of Amendment 32, from 1997-2001; and finally, the totals following the
adoption of Amendment 32, from 2001-2007. Additionally, the totals of common laws
passed and vetoed were separated using the same convention. Next, conclusions about
how the executive-legislative relationship evolved as a result of provisional decrees and
Amendment 32 were reached after both hypotheses were analyzed. Finally, I address the
impact of legislative support Presidents Cardoso and Lula possessed during their
administration, and measured its influence on the usage of provisional decrees.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
While presidential systems are defined by the separation of administrative,
legislative, and judicial powers, most systems empower their executives with abilities to
help shape the legislative process. In order to avoid a presidential veto, it is generally
expected that legislatures will work with presidents to ensure that legislation is reflective
of their administrative and legislative priorities. Although this provides presidents with
the unique ability to shape and influence the legislative process, it is the ultimate
responsibility of the legislature to pass, amend, and repeal laws.
In Brazil, it is clear that the use of provisional decrees has affected the method
through which presidents influence the legislative process. After analyzing the data
compiled from the official website of the Brazilian Federal Government, Planalto, I
reached the conclusion that presidents have routinized their use of provisional decrees; in
effect, it has allowed Presidents Cardoso and Lula to circumvent the prerogatives and
responsibilities of Congress to initiate the legislative process.
Issuing a total of 1,116 provisional decrees from 1997 to 2007, Brazilian
Presidents Cardoso and Lula effectively created over 33% of all new laws, independent
from the traditional legislative process. Found in table 4.1, this data suggests that
Presidents Lula and Cardoso held considerable power over the legislative and policy
agenda of the Brazilian Congress.
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Provisional Decree and Common Laws Totals from 1997 to 2007
Decrees (Issued + Reissued)
Bills Passed
Total
Percentage Decrees (((Decrees Issued + Reissued)/Total))*100)
Percentage Bills (Bills Passed/Total)

1,116
2,242
3,358
33%
67%

Table 4.1: Provisional Decree and Common Laws Totals from 1997 to 2007

Under President Cardoso, his 806 provisional decrees accounted for 40% of all
new laws adopted from 1997-2002. During this same time period, the Congress passed
1,209 common laws under the traditional legislative process, as demonstrated in table 4.2.
While the number of laws during this time period was predominantly laws passed by the
legislature, it is still important to underscore that President Cardoso was still able to have
his legislative initiatives enacted through provisional decrees. In a presidential system, it
is expected that an executive have some influence over the legislative process; however,
it is not expected that this influence would comprise 40% of all new laws passed.
Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals Under President Cardoso (1997-2002)
Provisional Decrees Issued
Decrees Re-Issued
Decrees Converted
Total Decrees Issued
Percentage of Decrees Converted ((Converted/ Total Issued)*100)
Common Laws Passed
Total Laws Passed (Total Decrees Issued + Common Laws Passed)
Percentage of Law as Decree ((Total Decrees/Total Laws Passed)*100)
Percentage of Law as Common Laws ((Total Common Laws/Total Laws Passed)*100)

353
453
257
806
32%
1,209
2,015
40%
60%

Table 4.2: Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals under President Cardoso (1997-2002)

While the total number of provisional decrees issued under (420) President Lula
was much smaller because of the reforms set into effect by Amendment 32, the
conclusions and data remained largely the same. Although Lula’s provisional decrees
accounted for 19% of all new laws passed during his presidency, his provisional decrees
were nonetheless converted into law at a high rate, approximately 87%. This data is
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found in table 4.3. Designed as an emergency power, Presidents Cardoso and Lula
historically used provisional decrees to impact the policy agenda and to control the
national legislative process; and thus, this data supports hypothesis 1.
Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals under President Lula (2003-2010)
Provisional Decrees Issued
Decrees Re-Issued
Decrees Converted
Total Decrees Issued
Percentage of Decrees Converted ((Converted/ Total Issued)*100)

420
0
366
420
87%

Common Laws Passed
Total Laws Passed (Total Decrees Issued + Common Laws Passed)
Percentage of Law as Decree ((Total Decrees/Total Laws Passed)*100)
Percentage of Law as Common Laws ((Total Common Laws/Total Laws Passed)*100)

1773
2193
19%
80%

Table 4.3 Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals under President Lula (2003-2010)

It is important to underscore the importance behind the total number of provisional
decrees issued and the subsequent number of those degrees converted into law. For the
time frame measured, Presidents Cardoso and Lula effectively issued a total of 1,116
provisional decrees, brining into existence new federal departments, established new
regulatory measures, and directed federal funds without the oversight and duties of the
Congress, as demonstrated in chart 4.1.
Constitutionally, these decrees are provisional and subject to legislative approval;
however in practice, very few were challenged by the legislature. Under Cardoso,
Congress rejected only 1 of his decrees and converted nearly 60%, or 257 of his decrees;
and because Amendment 32 was not yet adopted, Cardoso was able to reissue his decrees
without limit for the majority of his presidency. Of his 251 decrees prior to the adoption
of amendment 32, he reissued those decrees over 453 times. Under Lula, where
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Amendment 32 restrained him, Congress rejected a total 10%, or 43, of his 420
provisional decrees. Additionally, Congress converted 87% of his decrees, a total of 362.
Given the data, it becomes clear that Congress adopted Amendment 32 in an attempt to
curtail the use of provisional decrees; however, the effect was not as strong as the intent
of the amendment.

140

133

120

111

109

93

100

82
80
60
40

73
66

67
59

5857

57
4743

3432

45

3836
23
16

20

70
60

67
60
42
34

20
18
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

0
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001
2001
(Pre
(Post
Amend. Amend.
32)
32)

Year
Provisional Decrees Issued

Decrees Converted

Decrees Reissued
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After adopting Amendment 32, the Brazilian National Congress was able to regain some
power and oversight over the executive by limiting the ability to reissue provisional
decrees. Prior to Amendment 32, Cardoso reissued decrees over 453 times; under Lula
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and Amendment 32, the number of reissued decrees dropped to zero, according to the
data, as represented in table 4.3.
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Unable to permanently legislate through decree, Presidents Cardoso and Lula
were forced to seek Congressional approval of their decrees. Moreover from 2002-2007,
Congress exercised its ability to invalidate and rejected decrees far more often. Under
Lula, a total of 42 decrees were either rejected by a vote of Congress, were overturned via
a new law passed by Congress, or impaired by Congress; conversely under Cardoso, only
one of his decrees was rejected. After the adoption of Amendment 32, moreover,
Congress was able to enact more laws through the traditional legislative process than
before. Under Lula, 1,773 ordinary laws were passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President, with only 154 being subjected to veto. Under Cardoso, this number was
lower: 971 laws to 83 vetoes. Additionally, the total number of provisional decrees also
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fell after Amendment 32. Prior to Amendment 32, Cardoso issued 806 provisional
decrees; Lula issued 420 decrees, a 52% net decline. While this data supports the
contention that Congress was able to curtail the use of provisional decrees and regain its
oversight responsibilities, it does not fully support the notion that Amendment 32
fundamentally altered the existing executive-legislative relationship. If the relationship
changed, the data would be reflective of more Congressional oversight, as measured by
the increase in provisional decrees found ineffective, impaired, or rejected; however, it
does not, as observed in chart 4.3.
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After adopting Amendment 32, the percentage of decrees that were converted into
law actually rose. Under Lula, nearly 88% of his decrees were issued against 68% of
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Cardoso’s. Although Congress rejected a higher percentage of decrees following
Amendment 32, it nonetheless ratified a large percentage of Lula’s decrees. While
suggests that by-and-large, Congress supported the Presidents Cardoso and Lula’s
agendas, the two Presidents exercised their veto authority more dynamically. Under
Cardoso, he vetoed 83, or 8.5%, of the total 971 bills presented to him; whereas Congress
rejected 1, or less than .01% of his decrees. Lula, moreover, vetoed a higher percentage
of the 1,271 bills presented to him, 13%, or 154 total vetoes. Comparing the data, Lula
rejected a higher percentage of bills passed through Congress than the percentage of
provisional decrees congress rejected: 13% of laws were vetoed compared to 10% of
decrees that were rejected. Taken as a whole, the data confirms the initial aspect of
hypothesis 2, where Congress attempted to limit the use of provisional decree usage;
however, it does not support the contention that Amendment 32 dynamically shifted the
executive-legislative relationship towards more legislative oversight. If there were more
oversight, there would have been an increase in the total number decrees rejected,
impaired, repealed, ineffective, and revoked. While Amendment 32 impacted Presidents
Cardoso and Lula’s ability to issue provisional decrees, it is also important to address
each president’s respective legislative support in Congress and its impact on provisional
decrees.
Presidential Support in the Brazilian National Congress
In any presidential democracy, the level of institutional support a president has in
the legislature is a strong potential influence on the relationship between the two
branches, and is an indicator of how an executive’s legislative agenda will be acted upon.
In the United States and other presidential democracies, legislative support is relatively
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easy to quantify as the number of political parties is quite often few. This does not hold
true for Brazil.
Elected through an open-list proportional representation system, the number of
parties and legislators represented in the Brazilian National Congress’s changes
frequently with each individual election for the 81 seats for the Federal Senate and 513 in
the Chamber of Deputies. Additionally, there are over 28 registered political parties that
all compete for seats in Congress; as of the 2010 legislative elections, 22 parties have
members represented in either chamber of Congress (Political Database of the Americas).
Due to the various influences discussed in chapter 2, such as the weak and poorly
disciplined parties, the frequent trend of legislators switching political parties, and
Samuel’s gubernatorial coattails effect, Brazilian presidents often struggle to rally
legislative support in Congress. Specifically for provisional decrees, the level of
legislative support a president possesses could be a relevant factor and influence in either
the issuance of certain provisional decrees or a president’s decision to use decrees in
general. Additionally, the level of support provides insights into the motivations behind
political decree conversion or rejection by the legislature. Thus, it is important to measure
this factor during the timeframe to see what effect—if any—it had on the issuance of
provisional decrees. To measure legislative support, the preferable way is to identify the
number of legislators that are affiliated with the president’s party. Using data obtained
from Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas, I analyzed election
data in the Chamber of Deputies from the 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 legislative
elections in order to see how much party support Presidents Cardoso and Lula possessed
during their administrations; the data were compiled into charts 4.4 and 4.5 below. I was
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unable to find accurate data concerning the party composition of the Federal Senate;
however, I believe that the Chamber of Deputies can serve as a barometer of Presidents
Cardoso and Lula’s each respective legislative support.
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During President Cardoso’s two terms as President, his party, the PSDB, never
possessed a plurality of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as demonstrated in figure
4.2. Of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, his party held approximately 13% and
19% of the 513 seats, from 1995-1999 and 1999-2003 respectfully. Overall, there were
over 20 parties that were competitive in the lower house during the Cardoso
administration, and could serve as a factor that would motivate the president to use
provisional decrees. While the PSDB never possessed a plurality of the seats in the
Chamber of Deputies, President Cardoso was still able to create a relatively large
governing coalition, comprised of the PSDB, the PFL, the PMDB, the PP, PPS, and PTD
parties; his coalition possessed 381, or 74%, of the total 594 seats combined in both
chambers of Congress (Pereira 2). Whereas Cardoso’s PSDB party never possessed a
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plurality of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, President Lula and the PT party
followed in a similar trend.
Throughout his administration, President Lula was forced to create governing
coalitions in order to effectively administer the government, although it proved to be
more challenging than during the Cardoso administration. During his first term as
President, Lula’s PT party possessed 91, or 17%, of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies,
the largest out of any party, as demonstrated in table 4.3. However due to the large
membership of the Chamber and the number of parties represented within it, Lula needed
additional support. Plagued with scandals and internal conflict within the PT concerning
Lula’s agenda, Lula struggled to maintain a minority coalition during his first two years
as president (Raile, Pereira and Power 5). However, Lula adapted to his mistakes and
managed to establish a working governing coalition between the PT, PMDB, PPS, PTB,
PcdoB, the PL, PSB, PV, and independent legislators to control 318 seats and 62% of the
Congress (Raile, Pereira and Power 5).
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Within the study of provisional decree issuance and usage in Brazil, it appears
that the relative strength of the president’s party does not have a substantial impact on a
president’s decision to exercise his decree authority. Comparing the party representation
of the PSDB and PT in the Congress with the number of decrees issued, rejected, and
converted into law, no relevant inferences or conclusions can be reached. During the
Cardoso and Lula administrations, both of their parties’ representation in the Chamber of
Deputies varied throughout. Yet, this does not provide any insights into why both
increasingly used provisional decrees or why Congress continued to support and/or reject
their decrees. If the party composition in the Chamber of Deputies was not correlated to
my data, the relative strength of their governing coalitions did not also provide any
additional insights.
From the data compiled by Raile, Pereira, and Power concerning governing
coalitions, I also found that the strength of Cardoso’s and Lula’s coalitions did not impact
the use, conversion, or rejection of provisional decrees. During Cardoso’s administration,
his coalition effectively controlled 74% of the seats in Congress; and yet, the number
decrees converted during his administration was actually lower than Lula’s, whose
coalition was neither as large nor cohesive. Of Cardoso’s 353 provisional decrees, the
Congress converted 73% of his total decrees; conversely under Lula, Congress converted
87% of his 420 decrees into law. I acquired this data by measuring the number of
provisional decrees issued and converted, as observed in tables 4.4 and 4.5.
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President Cardoso (1997-2002)
Issued:
Reissue:
Converted
Rejected
Percentage Converted ((Converted/Issued)*100)

353
453
257
12
73%

Table 4.4: Provisional Decrees Issued, Reissued, Converted, and Rejected Under President Cardoso

President Lula (2003-2011)
Issued:
Reissued:
Converted:
Rejected
Percentage Converted ((Converted/Issued)*100))
Table 4.5: Provisional Decrees Issued, Reissued, Converted, and Rejected Under President Lula

Summary of Findings
After evaluating my research as a whole, my findings support three broad
conclusions. First, provisional decrees have become fairly routinized in Brazil, and that
Presidents Cardoso and Lula utilized them regularly. Throughout the ten years that I
analyzed, Cardoso and Lula issued a total of 1,116 provisional decrees that possessed the
full force and effect of the law. Originally created as a measure to address important and
urgent cases, provisional decrees have become a regular tool for Brazilian presidents to
influence and control the legislative process. As a reaction to this regular use of
provisional decrees, the Brazilian National Congress adopted Amendment 32 in an effort
to curtail the executive’s reliance on these measures.
Second, although the adoption of Amendment 32 has had an impact on the usage
of provisional decrees by executives, it has not completely restrained Brazilian
presidents. While Amendment 32 effectively restricted presidents from reissuing their
decrees indefinitely, it did not impact Presidents Cardoso or Lula’s decision to usage
decrees. Following the adoption of Amendment 32, the data reflects an actual increase in
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420
0
366
6
87%

the total number of provisional decrees that were issued over the course of the five years I
measured. Under President Cardoso, he issued a total of 354 original provisional decrees;
where as President Lula issued 420. Additionally, percentage of provisional decrees that
were converted into law subsequently rose as well, 87% under Lula and 73 for Cardoso.
The research and data supports the conclusion that Amendment 32 itself was clearly
correlated with the rise in provisional decrees and the conversion rate, and that it was not
clearly influenced by other factors.
Finally, the research found that other sources of influence, such as the number of
seats controlled in the Chamber of Deputies by the president’s party or the size of the
president’s governing collation, were not clearly associated with the variation over time
in the number of decrees that were issued and subsequently converted into law. During
the two terms of both Cardoso and Lula, each president’s party held a large percentage of
the seats in the lower chamber of Congress and their governing coalitions were
comprised of more than 60% of the total Brazilian National Congress. It can be expected
that the more institutional and legislative support a president had, it would be more likely
that Congress would support the executive’s legislative agenda and provisional decrees.
However, this did not hold true. During Cardoso’s administration, his party possessed
20% and 31% of the Chamber of Deputies and his governing coalition accounted for 74%
of the legislature. Yet for all his support, Congress supported Lula’s provisional decrees
to a much larger extent than Cardoso’s. If party composition or the size of the president’s
governing coalition were correlated to provisional decree usage and conversion, President
Cardoso would have been more successful than President Lula.
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In the final chapter, I will discuss the general implications of my findings, how
my research is relevant to the established literature on provisional decrees, and finally
discuss the limitations of my study and suggest some proposals for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE
General Discussion
The literature on provisional decrees has generally supported two disparate
conclusions. Within this discussion, the research of Pereira, Power, and Renno support
the conclusion that provisional decrees represent a strong executive that has able to exert
and draw considerable power from the legislature. Conversely, Reich found that
provisional decrees do not necessarily represent a diminishment of legislative power, as
decrees are a rational expression of Brazil’s National Congress; additionally, he holds
that Congress is able to exercise considerable oversight via adopting amendments to
provisional decrees prior to conversion. Conclusively, my research and data generally
supported both interpretation concerning provisional decrees.
My research supported Perira et al.’s conclusions that Amendment 32 has
provided the President with more power to control the legislative agenda. They
concluded that the objective of Amendment 32 was to constrain the effectiveness of the
provisional decrees; and by mandating that the legislature must consider these decrees, it
would empower Congress with more independent oversight of the executive (Pereira,
Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential Decrees, and
the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress 17). Rather than
providing more oversight, they found that it actually limited and constrained the
legislature’s own power and legislative agenda (19). While my findings support their data
demonstrating that the use of provisional decrees and their subsequent conversion to law
increased following Amendment 32, my data and interpretation is not consistent with
their overall conclusions. Perira et al. argued that Congress has “reduced its own
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bargaining power and ceded further control to the executive” (19); however, they did not
examine Congress’s successful rejection of decrees and passage of their institution’s own
legislative outcomes. Following Amendment 32, Congress in fact exercised their
oversight prerogatives much more extensively than in prior to the adoption. Before
Amendment 32, Congress rejected 1 of President Cardoso’s provisional decree from
1995-2001; however after 2001, Congress rejected or impaired a total of 378 provisional
decrees. Additionally, Perira et al. did not consider the ability of Congress to use its own
lawmaking prerogatives and ratify laws through the institution itself.
In the five years after Amendment 32 was adopted, Congress was able to pass a
significantly larger number of bills under the traditional legislative process than during
the first five years of this study. From 2002-2007, Congress legislated a total 1,271 laws,
with 154 being subjected to presidential veto. From 1995-2001, Congress passed 971
news laws, with 83 being subjected to a veto. Institutionally, this data does not support
Perira et al.’s conclusion that Congress succeeded power to the executive. If this were
true, I would expect that Congress would have produced fewer bills and a subsequently
lower number of vetoes; however, this was not supported. While my findings supported
some of Pereira, Power, and Renno’s conclusions, my findings equally provided support
to the Reich’s interpretation of provisional decrees usage as a rational expression of the
legislature.
In contrast to Perira et al.’s finding, Renno contends that due to the unusual
institutional and constitutional arraignments, he research suggested that Congress
delegates some lawmaking authority to the executive. The primary reason being that due
to high turnover and a weakened committee structure, Congress lacks members that
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possess sufficient experience to author and introduce substantial legislation; thus, the
institution allows the executive to exercise provisional decrees, with Congress having
final oversight over the passage or rejection of the bill. While Renno observed the
number of provisional decrees converted into law with amendments attached, my
research nonetheless support his conclusion that Congress still possess substantial
oversight authority over the executive. Returning to the data concerning provisional
decrees rejected and impaired, there is a strong increase of the number of times Congress
rejected a decree, from 1 to 378. If Congress’s oversight power was diminished, we
would expect that the number of rejections to be low or nonexistent; conversely, my
research did not support this.
Moreover, my research neither supported nor weakened Renno’s contention
concerning the adoption of amendments to provisional decrees. From a legislative
oversight perspective, Renno’s data does not support Perira et al.’s conclusion that
provisional decree conversion was actually higher following Amendment 32. My data
supported Perira et al.’s conclusion, with nearly 88% of provisional decrees being
converted to law. However, I could not analyze whether or not the various decrees
possessed any amendments.
Limitations of Research and Suggestions for Further Research
To summarize, this study sought to add to the research and discussion of how
Brazil’s executive-legislative relationship has changed as a result of provisional decrees
and Amendment 32. I would have liked to observe Samuel’s “gubernatorial coattails
effect’s” impact on the dynamics in the legislature. If more Senators and Congressmen
rallied behind gubernatorial candidates, I would then expect this to further constrain a
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president’s legislative support and would expect to see a rise of provisional decrees.
Additionally, it would have been ideal to follow specific provisional decrees and analyze
them from a media and public opinion background. I believe that if the media and the
electorate’s opinion towards a specific decree was favorable, it would influence a
president’s position and help enhance the probability that the decrees would have passed.
However due to my limited understanding of Portuguese and limited resources, I was not
able to conduct this research. Ideally, I would have liked to track the process through
which Presidents Cardoso and Lula enacted their primer and more prominent pieces of
their legislative agenda. An analysis of how the two branches interacted would have
provided additional insights into their relationship. Lastly, I would have preferred to
analyze the individual text and scope of each individual decree, and measure the
importance of each. I would expect that more ceremonial decrees would have a higher
conversion rate; likewise, it would also be expected that decrees of a more substantial and
controversial nature to have a much lower conversion rate.
Taken together, I believe that an examination of the effects of the legislative
support presidents had in Congress, Samuel’s “gubernatorial coattails effect”, and the
media’s and public’s reaction to provisional decrees would provide a more accurate
representation of the evolution of executive power and the effects of provisional decrees.
By studying these facets more clearly and in greater detail, I believe that it would add
more to the body of knowledge concerning provisional decrees.
Conclusion
Brazil proved to be an excellent case study to study not only the effects of
provisional decrees, but also how the executive-legislative relationship can vary across
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different systems. Dynamic, fluid, and ever changing, the executive-legislative
relationship of Brazil’s federal government has in fact been influenced by provisional
decrees; however, the effects of which are certainly not clearly defined. Traditionally, the
rationale behind provisional decrees observes their usage as a gradual erosion of
legislative power and oversight over the executive. While this research supports the
conclusion that provisional decree usage has increased, the extent to which the
legislature’s oversight prerogatives have been diminished is not as clear.
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Appendix 1: Additional Provisional Decree Measures
Provisional Decrees Revoked
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees that were withdrawn by
presidents.
Provisional Decrees Found Unconstitutional
This measure refers to the amount of provisional decrees whose effectiveness was found
unconstitutional through the judicial review power of the Brazilian judicial system.
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Appendix 2: Provisional Decree Data
Year
Provisional Decrees
Issued
Decrees Converted
Decrees Reissued
Decrees Revoked
Total Decrees Issued
Decrees Repealed
Decrees Rejected
Decrees Ineffective
Decrees Impaired
Decrees Unconstitutional

1997

1998

1999

34
32
59
2
93
0
0
0
0
0

47
43
93
1
140
0
0
0
0
0

38
36
111
1
149
0
0
0
0
0

2000 2001 (Pre Amend. 32)

2001 (Post Amend. 32)

2002

23
16
57
7
80
0
0
0
0
0

109
45
133
1
242
11
1
0
0
0

20
18
0
0
20
0
2
0
0
0

82
67
0
0
82
0
12
1
0
0

2003
2004
2005
2006
Provisional Decrees
Issued
58
73
42
67
Decrees Converted
57
66
34
60
Decrees Reissued
0
0
0
0
Decrees Revoked
1
4
1
0
Total Decrees Issued
58
73
42
67
Decrees Repealed
0
0
0
Decrees Rejected
0
0
3
3
Decrees Ineffective
0
3
2
4
Decrees Impaired
0
0
2
0
Decrees Unconstitutional
0
0
0
0
Note: Red shading denotes the Cardoso administration and green denotes Lula’s presidency.

2007

2008

2009

2010

70
60
0
0
70
3
4
1
1
1

41
35
0
0
41
1
3
1
0
0

27
24
0
0
27
0
0
3
0
0

42
30
0

Year

67

42
0
1
10
1
0

Appendix 3: Ordinary Legislation Data
Years
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
169
178
175
219
230
238
201
Ordinary Laws Passed
2
4
15
31
31
24
30
Veto
Note: Red shading denotes the Cardoso administration and green denotes Lula’s presidency.
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2004
271
26

2005
184
25

2006
179
22

2007
198
27

2008
259
35

2009
290
46

2010
191
27

